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vFOREWORD
The current prospects for the global economy, shaped by economic recovery in the United States 
and the significant drop in oil prices, are likely to favor Central America, Panama and Dominican 
Republic. This new environment provides a suitable moment to reflect on the legacies of the 
crisis and ponder what has been achieved, the lessons learned, and remaining challenges. Let 
us recall that in the years prior to the crisis the countries of the region succeeded in strength-
ening their fiscal position and policy frameworks, including in the monetary sphere. With these 
foundations they succeeded in mitigating the negative effects of the crisis through the appli-
cation of counter-cyclical policies, taking advantage of better access to international markets.
However, the improved access to international markets and expansionary fiscal policy have 
been reflected in larger deficits and growing debt, both public and private, a trend that has not re-
verted. This report examines the current vulnerability of the region to possible new crisis episodes, 
and leads us to consider policies, which might reduce the exposure to these risks.
The improvement in the global economic environment is an opportunity for the countries of 
the region to strengthen their vision of macroeconomic stability; one which recognizes that the 
credit standing of a country depends on many factors beyond the level of debt, and that imbal-
ances in a particular sector can have effects on the rest of the economy. That is why the 2015 
Macroeconomic Report focuses on identifying the structural variables that can determine credit-
worthiness and explores the vulnerability of the economy from a multi-sector perspective. The aim 
of this document is to promote dialogue and assist the formulation of strategies and policies that 
will lead the economies of the region toward a path of stability and growth. 
Gina Montiel
General Manager
Country Department for
Mexico, Panama and the Dominican Republic
Inter-American Development Bank
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the years prior to the financial crisis, the countries of Central America, Panama and 
Dominican Republic undertook the task of creating fiscal space with the aim of setting the 
region on the path to growth and providing some protection against possible external shocks. 
These achievements were tested during the last financial crisis, when the region was able to 
relax its fiscal stance and successfully lessen the impacts of the crisis. More than four years 
after the crisis, however, fiscal deficits of the countries of the region remain high, eroding 
their room to maneuver and steadily increasing public debt. The region needs to rebuild its 
fiscal space and strengthen economic growth. The economic recovery of the United States, 
the region’s key partner, and the decline of oil prices seen since June 2014, provide a win-
dow of opportunity to increase growth and reduce the vulnerabilities inherited from the fi-
nancial crisis. 
This report explores two of the main legacies of the financial crisis in the context of the cur-
rent favorable environment. The first is the increase in public debt as a result of larger fiscal defi-
cits. This in turn has eroded the fiscal space to maneuver in response to any future downturn in the 
economic cycle, implying higher risk perceived by international investors. Chapter 2 analyzes how 
the region could take advantage of the favorable environment to improve the risk perception of in-
ternational investors. It highlights the importance of the fiscal agenda for the achievement of this 
end, but also emphasizes the need to undertake a broader agenda of institutional reforms, and to 
grasp the opportunity provided by the current favorable phase of the cycle. As the credit profile of 
the region improves, the more likely it will have access to at lower rates. Thus, making it easier to 
finance counter-cyclical fiscal policies to mitigate the effects of negative shocks. 
The crisis also triggered significant changes in the patterns of external flows. Greater access to 
external sources of finance at lower rates led to increased external debt and multiplied domestic fi-
nancial flows between sectors. Chapter 3 shows how this new dynamic makes the financial systems 
of the region more complex, increasing the probability that negative shocks will spread from one 
economic sector to the others. The chapter also portrays how authorities may react to the negative 
impacts of a reversal in external financial flows, either by permitting an economic contraction or 
by generating liquidity fiscally. Furthermore, chapter 3 spells out a series of policy options for the 
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new international financial environment geared to minimize the costs of a possible future interna-
tional financial shock. 
If the winds were to change? It is always possible that the benign prevailing conditions might 
change, transforming the region’s prospects. Chapter 4 of the Macroeconomic Report 2015 pro-
vides a brief analysis of the impact that a less favorable outlook could have on growth prospects 
in the next two years. It examines the effects of different shocks on the region: oil prices rising at 
a faster pace than expected; an economic slowdown in the United States; an increase in financial 
volatility; and finally, all three shocks combined. The results of the simulations suggest the region 
would need to adapt to lower growth. Thus, this chapter shows the importance for the countries in 
the region of reducing their vulnerability to changes in the external environment, reinforcing the 
analysis and arguments of earlier chapters. 
1THE MACROECONOMIC 
CHALLENGES FOR THE REGION
The substantial opening of the countries of Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic (CAPDR or the region) makes them especially vulnerable to external shocks, as the international financial crisis of the past decade has revealed. This has presented major 
macroeconomic challenges to the region in recent years. After the international crisis, the expan-
sive monetary policy of developed countries produced an environment of high liquidity in which 
leverage was possible at lower cost. Although the region is progressively recovering to its former 
levels of economic growth; yet, it has not been enough. The countries appear to be converging 
towards a new equilibrium of low growth at the cost of high fiscal and external deficits. However, 
the international context is changing, creating opportunities for the region. 
The Graph 1.1 shows that growth forecasts for the United States, the biggest trade and finan-
cial partner of CAPDR, have improved to 3.6% in 2015 (0.8 percentage points more than the ac-
tual growth in 2014) in a context in which the growth expectations for the largest economies in 
the rest of the world were downgraded. This explains the improvement in the forecast growth for 
CAPDR in 2015 (to 4%) despite the decline in the growth expectations for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC). 
The CAPDR’s high degree of depen-
dence on the United States economy (see 
Graph 1.2 and Graph 1.3) could provide a 
lift to the region, through its stimulus to ex-
ternal demand, transfers of remittances and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, which 
continue to be the main source of financing 
for its current account deficits (which rep-
resent 5% of the regional Gross Domestic 
Product, GDP, in 2010–2014, the post-crisis 
period). In particular, Graph 1.3 shows that, 
on average, 27.1% of regional GDP is attrib-
utable to the bilateral relationship between 
I
GRAPH 1.1  Annual Real GDP Growth Prospects by 
Economic Zones, 2015
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the region and the United States, of which approximately 12% of GDP is represented by exports, 8.6% 
by the stock of FDI and remittances accounting for the remainder. The most dependent economy is 
Honduras (43.9% of GDP), and the less dependent is Dominican Republic (14.3% of GDP).
At the same time, the world seems to be heading towards a lower level of commodity prices. 
Graph 1.4 shows that, despite a slight increase in the coffee price, the overall trend since 2011 is 
downward. This might cast doubt on the region’s trade recovery, but it should be noted that the sig-
nificant fall in oil prices in 2015 could produce a significant price-related improvement in the re-
gion’s trade balance (as oil represented approximately 20% of total CAPDR expenditure on goods 
imports in 2014).
Graph 1.5 shows the net oil import position of the region, as well as the important weight that 
the oil trade balance has on the regional GDP (6.4%) and its close relationship with the total trade 
GRAPH 1.2 CAPDR Dependence on U.S., by Totals, 2012
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GRAPH 1.3 CAPDR Dependence on U.S., by GDP, 2012
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balance (which, in 2014, recorded a deficit 
of 17.3% of regional GDP). Considering this 
circumstances, an international environ-
ment of low oil prices could therefore fa-
cilitate a reduction in the region’s import 
bill, producing a favorable impact on the ex-
ternal trade balance. 
However, there are also risks arising 
from the international environment. The 
economic recovery in the United States 
has led to the reversal of their expansive 
monetary policies, which is affecting the 
interest rates and calling into question 
the sustainability of emerging countries’ 
public debt. As a result, the perception 
of risk in CAPDR countries has worsened, 
leaving little space to mitigate the effects 
of future crises and questioning the sus-
tainability of the deficit until higher level 
of growth are achieved. In spite of this, 
there is still an opportunity to introduce 
gradual reforms that prepare the coun-
tries for an external environment always 
dynamic. 
The reversal of loose monetary poli-
cies and the higher perception of credit risk 
in the region are set against an environ-
ment that is leaning towards lower oil prices 
and stronger economic growth of the main trade partner, United States. Consequently, the region 
could set off on a path of enhancing its macroeconomic policy framework, taking advantage of the 
window of opportunity that remains open. 
THE MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOK OF THE REGION IN A NEW CONTEXT
The behavior of the main macroeconomic indicators of CAPDR in 2014 was very similar to 2013. 
The gradual descent of international commodity prices eased pressure on the overall level of 
local prices; so that inflation ended 2014 at 3.6% (see Graph 1.6). This made it possible for 
monetary policy to be less focused on the inflation target and more favorable to promote eco-
nomic growth. 
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GRAPH 1.5  Total Trade Balance and the Oil Balance 
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Similarly, the region’s banking system 
remains solid. Graph 1.7 shows how the do-
mestic credit maintained a similar level of 
leverage in private economic activity com-
pared to previous years, with loans to pri-
vate sector averaging 43.6% of regional 
GDP in 2014. In addition, there was a re-
duction in non-performing loans and there-
fore in bank provisions to cover them. This 
reflects the average credit quality in the re-
gion after having deteriorated during the 
global crisis. This achievement is mostly at-
tributable to lower inflation and exchange 
rate management which has provided sta-
bility in local nominal interest rates. 
Meanwhile, the current account posi-
tion is also relatively favorable. It is pos-
sible that the trends in external conditions 
are likely to improve the regional balance 
(see Graph 1.8). In 2014, CAPDR countries 
had an average external deficit of 6.7% of 
GDP; exports and imports of goods around 
21.3% and 39% of GDP, respectively; and 
remittance receipts equivalent to 8.5% of 
GDP (USD 20,415.7 million in total). 
Now, given that: a) the United States, 
the main CAPDR trade partner, has im-
proved its growth outlook to 3.6% in 2015, b) the unemployment rate of Latinos or Hispanics in the 
U.S. is expected to fall from 7% in 2014 to 6.4% in 2015, and c) the international oil price is likely 
to remain close to lower levels as experienced at the beginning of the year, being clearly lower than 
those of 2014;1 the region’s current account deficit could shrink from 6.7% to 3.2% of GDP, not only 
because of the increase in exports of goods and fall in imports (to 23.7% and 37.3% of GDP, respec-
tively), but also thanks to a continued rise in remittance income (forecast to rise by 5.7% in 2015).
In this relatively positive environment, the fiscal position continues to be the main challenge. In 
2014, the regional fiscal deficit averaged 3.5% of GDP, close to its 2013 level, with central government 
1 Taking an average of the oil price estimates from different commodity price sources, the reduction for 2015 
could take the price to USD 57.4 per barrel (see, for instance, U.S. Energy Information Administration and 
Commodity prices – International Monetary Fund).
GRAPH 1.6 Inflation: CAPDR
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GRAPH 1.7 Quality of the Loan Portfolio: CAPDR*
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revenue and expenditure also remaining at 
similar levels of 19.6% and 23%, respec-
tively. Despite the new growth environment 
and lower oil prices, the fiscal impacts are 
only marginally positive. So, a fiscal deficit of 
3.2% of GDP is expected in 2015, compared 
to 3.5% in 2014 (see Graph 1.9). 
To translate higher economic activity 
into higher fiscal revenues, CAPDR need 
to recognize its dependency on tax incen-
tives to attract FDI. Clearly, the region faces 
pressure from international tax competi-
tion and, traditionally, fiscal incentives in 
the free economic zones have been an im-
portant tool to attract FDI. These systems of 
incentives to subsidize exports have proven 
to be very costly for the region and have 
constrained the tax base.2 Therefore, un-
less the new revenues are complemented by 
measures to review institutional channels 
and by alternative mechanisms to attract 
investment, the recovery of economy will 
not be sufficient to prevent deterioration 
in the public finances of the region, which 
will continue to affect its creditworthiness. 
Thus the main challenge that the region con-
tinues to face is fiscal consolidation. 
In this environment, a growth rate of 4.0% is expected for 2014, higher than in previous year 
but still below the average growth rate of 5.6% in the period 2004–2007. Therefore, the region 
seems to be converging to a growth path that would be between the long-term rate of 3.6% in 1980–
2013 and the 4.3% averaged during the past decade (see Graph 1.10). This implies that the regional 
recovery after the financial crisis was only a first step towards narrowing the gaps, and is advancing 
with mixed results. Although lessons have been learned from past mistakes, risks remain. 
In particular, it is evident that the region is not immune from the impact of the withdrawal of 
monetary stimulus in the United States on global interest rates and financial flows. This may per-
suade investors to keep their assets in the U.S., constraining the supply of short and long-term 
funds to the region. In this scenario, the risk of encountering a new external shock could increase 
GRAPH 1.8  Current Account Deficit in a Better 
Outlook: CAPDR
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GRAPH 1.9 Fiscal Deficit in a Better Outlook: CAPDR
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to the point where CAPDR countries are 
obliged to react via fiscal policy. 
LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS
The recent financial crisis confirmed that 
CAPDR is not isolated from business cy-
cles in international dynamics and, still 
more importantly, revealed that the ma-
jority of the countries of the region have 
learned to avoid procyclical fiscal policies. 
Studying the cyclicality between econom-
ic policies and real GDP, the respons-
es during the crisis episodes is detailed 
in Graph 1.11. In the graph is present-
ed the responses of fiscal and monetary 
policy to crises3 for the 2000–2005 and 
2006–2012 periods. For fiscal policy, a 
positive sign of the indicator indicates 
procyclical policy; when the sign is neg-
ative, policy is countercyclical. For mon-
etary policy, the opposite applies. Of the 
eight countries in CAPDR, only three suf-
fered several episodes of output crisis 
which allow a comparison between policy 
before and after a given time.4 
Distinguishing between the region’s re-
sponses to external shocks before and after 
2006,5 it emerges that the crises prior to 
GRAPH 1.10 Real GDP Growth in the Long Term: 
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GRAPH 1.11  Cyclicality of Economic Policies During 
Crises: CAPDR*
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2006 were mainly tackled through the adop-
tion of procyclical economic policies. By con-
trast, after 2006, particularly during the 
global crisis, the fiscal policy stance was 
countercyclical (an expansive response). For 
its part, the monetary response was generally 
less restrictive than before. That is, it would 
appear that the region “has graduated” in the 
application of countercyclical policies. 
At the same time, past experience sug-
gests that the fiscal and monetary policy ori-
entation of CAPDR countries can affect the 
scale of the crises, and that a response to 
downturns in the cycle can mitigate its vol-
atility. Indeed, this seems to have been the 
case, although CAPDR spent an average of 
16.3% of its time in crisis (measured in quar-
ters) in the post-2006 period, its output was 
less affected than in past crises (3.4% the 
biggest average contraction, Graph 1.12). 
This was possible because before the crisis, 
adjustment policies and debt forgiveness had 
allowed CAPDR countries to progressively re-
duce their public debt, improve the near-term 
credit profile for investors and increase the 
fiscal space for countercyclical policies. 
Graph 1.13 confirms that before the 
crisis, the CAPDR region was already gaining credibility among investors and improving the per-
ception that the countries could meet their debt obligations. At the same time, total public debt fell, 
from 55% of regional GDP in 2003 to 28.7% of GDP in 2008, in line with the region’s progress in 
reducing the fiscal deficit experienced by the region. 
This event has helped to change the structure or composition of the region’s public financing. 
CAPDR has been gradually restructuring its total public debt portfolio, increasing the share of do-
mestic liabilities, in the hands of local creditors, in national currency and long-term. Table 1.1 shows 
the region’s debt emissions during the last five years. In summary, two aspects can be appreciated. 
Firstly, the terms have been lengthening. Between the years 2009 and 2011, the average issue had 
a maturity of about 10 years. Between the years 2013 and 2014, the average maturity for debt is-
suance was 18 years. Secondly, the costs are lower. Between the years 2009 and 2011, the average 
10 year issuance paid a yield of 6.20%. Between the years 2013 and 2014, the average yield for 10 
year debt issuance was 5.49%.
GRAPH 1.12 Characteristics of the Crises: CAPDR
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GRAPH 1.13  Creditworthiness (Institutional Investors 
Rating, IIR) and Public Debt: CAPDR*
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This implies that after the crisis, the share of short-term debt has diminished (to represent 
9.5% of total public debt in 2014, as can be seen in Graph 1.14).6 In principle, this suggests a lower 
average risk for debt refinancing, although the amount of short-term debt remains significant for 
the region (at around 4.2% of regional GDP). In addition, after a fall provoked by the financial crisis, 
the public debt profile regained the share that was financed at fixed interest rates (in 2014, this rep-
resent 80% of the total), which gives the region a buffer against increases in international interest 
rates. Finally, the share of debt in national currency increased, reducing the risks of mismatches 
between the currency composition of debt and the composition of production, which tend to exac-
erbate the fiscal impacts of an external shock. 
6 Short-term public debt is associated with public sector liabilities, whose maturity is less than or equal to 
one year (for instance, domestically issued Treasury notes).
TABLE 1.1 International Bond Issues by Governments in CAPDR* 
Country Issue date Maturity Term (years) Coupon
Costa Rica 11/21/2012 1/26/2023 10 4.25%
4/30/2013 4/30/2025 12 4.38%
4/30/2013 4/30/2043 30 5.63%
4/4/2014 4/4/2044 30 7.00%
Dominican Republic 6/5/2010 6/5/2021 11 7.50%
4/18/2013 4/18/2024 11 5.88%
10/28/2013 1/28/2024 10 6.60%
4/30/2014 4/30/2044 30 7.45%
El Salvador 1/12/2009 1/12/2019 10 7.38%
1/2/2011 1/2/2041 30 7.63%
5/12/2012 1/30/2025 12 5.88%
9/18/2014 1/18/2027 12 6.38%
Guatemala 6/6/2012 6/6/2022 10 5.75%
2/13/2013 2/13/2028 15 4.88%
Honduras 3/15/2013 3/15/2024 11 7.50%
12/16/2013 12/16/2020 7 8.75%
Panama 11/23/2009 1/30/2020 10 5.20%
6/24/2011 6/15/2018 7 5.00%
1/30/2012 7/25/2022 10 5.63%
4/29/2013 4/29/2053 40 4.30%
9/22/2014 9/22/2024 10 4.00%
Source: Bloomberg (December, 2014).
Note: *Risk rated international debt issues. Does not include Nicaragua, which reported issuance of only short-term domestic Central Bank 
notes.
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Therefore, the region built up sufficient credibility before the financial crisis to be able to 
adopt countercyclical policies. In addition, it took advantage of international financial conditions 
to improve its debt profile. However, it generated some risks, which are analyzed in detail below.
THE RISKS INHERITED FROM THE CRISIS
The fiscal position is one of the main risks inherited from the financial crisis. CAPDR used its 
fiscal space to mitigate the impacts of the crisis and stimulate economic activity through high-
er spending. Unfortunately, the spend-
ing increase was concentrated on current 
spending, most of which is rigid, making 
it difficult to bring spending back down. 
This is reflected in the high fiscal defi-
cits recorded in the years subsequent to 
the crisis.7
Between 2003 and 2007, investors 
perceived the performance of CAPDR coun-
tries as positive, encouraged by the reduc-
tion in public debt and the advances in fiscal 
consolidation processes. But the response 
by CAPDR to the financial crisis of 2008–09 
bore witness to the countries’ macroeco-
nomic weaknesses. 
GRAPH 1.14 Profile of the Total Public Debt: CAPDR* 
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GRAPH 1.15  Relationship between Debt and 
Creditworthiness: CAPDR (2003–2013)*
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(International Monetary Fund, October 2014).
Note: *does not include Belize.
7 See Graph 1.9.
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Now there has been a deterioration in the region’s creditworthiness. Graph 1.15 shows how 
the public debt in 2013 which was, on average, around 55% of GDP, was associated with a higher 
perception of risk by investors than the results at 2008, of 28.7%, where the debt reaches its lowest 
value in the decade. From that moment until 2013, the region increased its liabilities, eroding its 
fiscal space to respond to economic downturns. 
This situation reinforces the need to tackle the fiscal agenda once more. The international con-
text for this task is favorable. Higher growth will allow higher fiscal revenues. Moreover, lower oil 
prices can improve the fiscal balance. Izquierdo and Manzano (2012) explain that, on average, the 
previous increase in the oil prices had created an additional fiscal burden of more than 1% of GDP, 
related to subsidies and reductions in tax rates. The extent to which the fiscal burden can be eased 
in response to the new lower price levels will depend on the amount by which these subsidies are 
adjusted and tax revenues restored. 
As analyzed in Chapter 2 of this publication, this favorable environment could be used to im-
prove international financial agents’ perception of the region. This would give the region more 
balanced access to international financial markets (between periods of crisis and growth) and facil-
itate the implementation of more effective countercyclical policies. As this chapter highlights, the 
fiscal agenda is important in terms of its impact on perceptions, but a broader agenda of institu-
tional reforms, which could be implemented in this favorable phase of the cycle, is also necessary. 
Regarding the fiscal agenda, as highlighted by Izquierdo et al. (2013), the countercyclical 
policy of the region was successful, but the problem was the instrument used. As they stress, much 
of the increase in spending was in the form of rigid expenditures, such as salaries and transfers, 
making it difficult to withdraw the fiscal stimulus once the economy had recovered. This points to 
an agenda focused on reducing subsidies, civil service reform, and improvements in public service 
efficiency, among other things. 
Finally, it is important to restore tax revenues. Although nominal fiscal revenues have recov-
ered by 43.1% since 2010, their growth as a share of GDP has been modest (an increase of just 
0.5 percentage points, to a 19.6% of GDP), in spite of the fact that the region implemented reforms 
which, on average, should have yielded 1.4% of GDP (Izquierdo and Manzano, 2012). Two areas of 
erosion are identified: firstly, there is the approval of tax reforms to “replace” the end of exemptions 
given to countries of the region so that fiscal benefits used to boost exports (tax-free zones). As an-
alyzed by Gutiérrez and Manzano (2014), these measures have high fiscal costs with few benefits 
for development. Secondly, there are deficiencies in tax administration, and solving these is one of 
the pending tasks for the region. 
Similarly, the crisis caused significant changes in the patters of external flows. As was argued 
by Gutiérrez and Manzano (2014) and can be seen in Graph 1.16, the region went from financing its 
current account deficit mainly with FDI to a greater dependence on financial portfolio flows. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, the total external debt of the region increased. 
However, not only did external debt increase, but also internal financial flows multiplied. This 
makes the financial systems of the region more complex and increases the probability of contagion 
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between the different actors in the system. As a result, a reversal of external financial flows could 
have a significant impact on local economies, presenting governments with a dilemma: to allow 
an economic contraction or create liquidity via fiscal instruments. As analyzed by Izquierdo and 
Manzano (2012), credit booms in Central America are followed by a drastic reduction in growth 
rates; therefore, the pressure to look to fiscal remedies to mitigate the crisis.
In this regard, Izquierdo and Manzano (2012) argue that after the global financial crisis, the 
focus of debate has shifted towards the inclusion of an additional dynamic component in the de-
sign of financial regulation. Dynamic provisioning schemes require banks to build a provisional 
fund (additional to the static component) during the “good times” in anticipation of losses on un-
paid loans that materialize during “bad times”. Beyond this, Chapter 3 presents a series of policy 
options to reduce the costs of a potential international financial shock in the new international fi-
nancial environment. 
The region is at a propitious moment, in which it needs to recognize its strengths, threats 
and risks and be able to respond accordingly. In general, the environment is positive, as shown in 
Chapter 4. A scenario of higher growth in the United States and lower oil prices could have a sig-
nificant positive impact on the region’s growth. However, the financial picture is uncertain and in-
terest rates are likely to increase. This would negatively affect the growth gains derived from low oil 
prices and recovery in the United States. It is necessary to take advantage of this particular window 
of opportunity, not seen in the region on a long time. The region need to pay attention to this con-
text to improve the conditions for fiscal and external support, rethink the incentives used to attract 
capital and move ahead with sustainable growth strategies where prevail a greater fiscal, monetary 
and financial coordination. 
GRAPH 1.16 Deficit on Current Account and Foreign Direct Investment Flows to CAPDR
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DEBT AND CREDIT QUALITY
During the years prior to the international financial crisis (2008–09), the countries of Central America, Panama and Dominican Republic (from here on, CAPDR or the region) conducted processes of fiscal consolidation, which enabled them to reduce their levels of public debt 
and create some fiscal room for maneuver. This allowed the authorities to carry out an expansionary 
fiscal policy to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis. As the CAPDR Macroeconomic Report 
2013 of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) set out, the increase in spending in response 
to the crisis was biased toward rigid current spending in the majority of countries of the region. 
This dynamic, combined with a reduction in tax revenues, produced persistent fiscal deficits from 
2009 onwards, and, consequently, significant growth in public debt. 
The continuous growth in debt, without clear signs of fiscal consolidation, and given the lack 
of reforms to rebuild fiscal space to withstand future crises, has caused investors to increase their 
perception of risk in the region. This dynamic could raise financing costs and limit access to the 
international resources needed to resolve the social and productive investment gaps the region 
faces. 
This chapter analyzes the relationship between debt levels and credit ratings of the region and 
identifies the factors which affect this relationship. Recommendations and policy guidelines based 
on this analysis are presented for the region.
WHAT DETERMINES INVESTORS’ VIEW?
Traditionally, it has been thought that lower levels of indebtedness in an economy are related 
to a better risk rating in financial markets, as less debt is associated with greater public sec-
tor capacity to meet obligations. However, different studies have found that this negative rela-
tionship is not always true, and instead it depends on a large number of factors. For instance, 
studies based on the debt intolerance1 approach find that the ability of a government to manage 
II
1 Developed initially by Reinhart et al. (2003) and recently revised by Bannister et al. (2011). 
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a given level of public debt (or its debt tolerance) is explained by differences in the economy’s 
structural variables, such as per capita income and credit and inflation history. This analytical 
framework seeks to clarify why economies such as Japan enjoy lower financing costs despite 
having a debt-to-gdp ratio in excess of 200%, while others, with a much lower debt burden, 
have to pay higher interest rates. 
In this chapter the Institutional Investor Rating (IIR)2 is used as a proxy for credit quality, 
given that it has a high correlation with the risk ratings published by ratings agencies such as 
Moody’s (see Graph 2.1). Examining the re-
lationship between the IIR and the stock of 
debt for a sample of 104 countries between 
1989 and 2013, it can be seen that the rela-
tionship between these variables is not uni-
form (see Graph 2.2). 
Which are the characteristics, beyond 
the level of debt, that explain the differ-
ences in the credit perception? To answer 
this question, the sample is first divided into 
groups (or clusters) based on debt levels 
and credit ratings. At the same time other 
variables, such as institutional strength,3 
GRAPH 2.1 The IIR And Credit Ratings
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GRAPH 2.2 Apparent Inverse Relationship and Regions 1989–2013
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Source: IDB staff based on Moody’s and Institutional Investor Magazine.
2 The IIR is an index constructed by Institutional Investor Magazine from semi-annual surveys of economists 
and sovereign risk analysts from different institutions that assign a score of between 1 and 100 per country 
in accordance with the perceived probability of cessation of payments. The valuations are weighted accord-
ing to their participating institution’s global exposure.
3 Measured by the control of corruption index from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators.
DeBT anD creDiT QUaliTY 15
productive structure,4 income,5 financial 
development, as well as their history of in-
flation and bankruptcy, are examined to 
approximate economic fundamentals in var-
ious dimensions.
Four groups are formed based on the 
available statistical information. These im-
plicitly respond not just to disparities in 
debt and credit quality, but also to measure-
ments of economic fundamentals in each 
country. Graph 2.3 shows clusters identi-
fied for the five year period of 2009–2013 
and Table 2.1 presents the basic statistics 
of each group:6
i. Countries with high levels of debt as a percentage of GDP (between 40% and 80%) and 
low credit rankings. Egypt, Vietnam, Nicaragua and Belize7 are countries belonging to this 
group. 
ii. Countries with average credit ratings and lower levels of debt (averaging 24% of GDP). 
Paraguay, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Dominican Republic 
would belong to this group. 
iii. Countries with high credit ratings and low levels of debt (32% of GDP, on average). 
Emerging economies such as Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Panama would belong to this 
group. 
iv. Countries with solid economic fundamentals (low levels of inflation, good credit histo-
ry and high per capita income) with a good credit rating but with high levels of debt 
(equivalent to 84% of GDP, on average). The United States and Japan would belong to 
this group. 
Table 2.2 illustrates the relative difference between groups and clusters in terms of some eco-
nomic fundamentals. Comparing Clusters 1 and 2, we find that both have a similar perception of 
credit quality, in spite of the fact that the second group has significantly lower debt levels than 
the first. Analyzing the structural characteristics, it can be observed that the higher level of debt 
GRAPH 2.3  Relationship Between Debt and Credit 
Rating Clusters—2009–2013
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Source: IDB staff based on debt data from each country and from 
Institutional Investor Magazine.
4 Quantified by the industrial complexity index from the Atlas of Industrial Complexity constructed by the 
John F. Kennedy School at Harvard. The index extrapolates the value added of exports to a measure of in-
dustrial complexity for the country.
5 Approximated by per capita Gross Domestic Product.
6 To create these groups a type of k-means clustering was used.
7 The subsequent analysis does not include Belize, given that its IIR data is available only for 2012 and 2013.
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in group 1 (relative to group 2) seems to be offset by greater financial depth and a more complex 
productive structure. On the other hand, the institutional strength of both clusters seems similar. 
The countries of Cluster 3 exhibit credit valuations above those of group 2, despite having 
higher public indebtedness. This greater capacity to tolerate debt is associated with greater insti-
tutional strength, measured by control of corruption, rule of law, accountability, safety, and trans-
parency. Group 3 also has a more diversified productive structure. 
TABLE 2.1  Statistical Summary (Averages in % of GDP, Except Where Otherwise Indicated)a
Indicator Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
IIRb 36.9 40.0 74.3 76.7
Debt 49.4 23.9 32.1 83.8
Balance Currente Account –4.6 –1.7 3.8 –0.3
Tax Burden 30.0 25.0 34.5 40.1
Complexity –0.3 –0.6 0.7 1.0
Depth 47.8 37.5 75.8 191.9
Integration –44.9 –30.3 21.3 –26.4
Control of Corruptionb –0.5 –0.6 0.7 1.2
Source: IDB staff with data from Institutional Investor Magazine and the International Monetary Fund (2014).
Note: 
a “Tails” were eliminated in each indicator (per cluster) to avoid outliers’ effects.
b Index
TABLE 2.2 Relevance of Factors Between Clusters to Improve the IIR
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Source: IDB staff. 
* Low correspond to a statistical significance between 10% and 15%, Medium between 5% and 9.9%; and High between 0% and 4.9%.
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Finally, comparing groups 3 and 4, the importance of structural factors in the perception of 
credit quality can be seen. Both groups have similar credit rankings despite the higher average 
levels of debt of group 4 (32.1% and 83.8% of GDP, respectively). This suggests that investors ap-
pear to be incorporating in their valuation of credit quality greater institutional strength, higher 
GDP per capita, and a more diversified productive structure of the countries in group 4.
BUT YOU DON’T LIVE ON DEBT ALONE…
The documented differences suggest that the debt level is one of many factors, which determines 
creditworthiness and its impact varies between different groups of countries. We, therefore, con-
jecture that economic fundamentals have a different impact on risk perception, in accordance 
with the group to which the country belongs, which might ease pressure on the debt adjust-
ment necessary to improve creditworthiness. Consequently, there are two types of approach-
es countries could focus on to improve credit quality. On one hand, there are a set of actions 
which could be carried out in the short-run to move within a particular group or cluster. On the 
other, there are actions which in the medium-term may enable a country to move to a group 
with better credit perception. 
In this section, we present estimations for each cluster with the aim of quantifying poten-
tial differentiated effects of the debt levels and economic fundamentals on creditworthiness. This 
builds on the model proposed by Bannister et al. (2011) by including variables that represent eco-
nomic fundamentals.8 
In general terms, we find the existence of an inverse relationship between debt and creditwor-
thiness. The results also suggest that the observed distinctions between clusters are reflected in 
the way in which adjustments in the debt have differentiated effects on creditworthiness. Such dif-
ferences are supported by results which confirm how other characteristics of the economy—namely 
control of corruption, depth of the financial system or the complexity of the productive structure—
maintain a positive relationship with the IIR.
In addition, the estimations confirm the existence of differentiated degrees (by cluster) of sen-
sitivity between creditworthiness and the level of public indebtedness, with the following conclu-
sions derived from the analysis (see Table 2.1 and Graphs 2.4–2.7):
• For the countries in Cluster 1, it is found that each reduction in debt equivalent to 1% 
of GDP produces, on average, an increase of 0.5% in the creditworthiness index (IIR).9 
8 See Annex 1 for greater detail on the methodology.
9 It is important to take into account that the impacts reported here are calculated for the average country 
in each cluster. In accordance with the model employed, the impact depends on the stock of debt specific to 
each country. Therefore, the heterogeneity in each group produces varying effects. For example, in the case 
of cluster 1, the impact of a debt adjustment of 1% of GDP on the IIR varies by between 0.4% and 1.1%.
THE LEGACY OF THE CRISIS: POLICY OPTIONS IN A POSITIVE ENVIRONMENT18
• For the countries in Cluster 2, the 
sensitivity of the IIR to changes in 
the level of indebtedness is similar. 
In this group, debt cuts of 1% of GDP 
improve creditworthiness by 0.6%.
• In Cluster 3 countries, the creditwor-
thiness index rises, on average, by 
0.4% when debt is adjusted by 1% 
of GDP. This suggests that, compared 
to previous cases, the relative impor-
tance of other factors, such as insti-
tutional quality and the development 
of the financial system, is greater. 
• Finally, in Cluster 4, the estimations 
show that the sensitivity of the IIR 
to changes in the debt is even small-
er: for each point of GDP adjustment 
in debt, the IIR increases by 0.1%.
It is important to evaluate how easy it 
is for a country to move from one cluster to 
another, given that the estimations above 
reveal that there are groups that would have 
a higher tolerance of debt, which could di-
minish the costs of rising indebtedness. 
Using the transition matrix (Table 2.3),10 the 
following observations are made: 
• Clusters 1 and 2: as seen in Table 2.1, 
countries in Cluster 1 and 2 are not, 
on average, very different in their 
structural indicators. Indeed, it can be 
observed that the countries of cluster 
1 have a higher tax burden, as well 
as slightly better control of corrup-
tion. However, the greater difference 
between both clusters is observed in
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debt levels. In this regard, the aver-
age country of Cluster 2 has 50% less 
debt than the average in Cluster 1. 
Given that this is the only important 
difference between the variables in 
the exercise, the average country of 
Cluster 1 could gain access to cluster 
2 and improve its credit rating by ad-
justing its debt.11 Indeed, given that 
changes in fiscal indicators could be 
seen as short-term ones compared to 
the other variables considered here, 
the transition between cluster 1 and 
2 is more common than the majority of other transitions between clusters (see Table 2.3).
• Clusters 2 and 3: transition between Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 is more costly and takes lon-
ger, because structural changes have direct results in the medium or long term. To move 
between Clusters 2 and 3, fiscal changes would not seem to be sufficient by themselves. 
To achieve the objective it would also be necessary to carry out a series of important ad-
justments in the level of integration, productive structure or control of corruption, or in 
all the indicators at the same time.12
• Clusters 3 and 4: for the transition between clusters 3 and 4, a similar pattern can be ob-
served to that in clusters 1 and 2. For example, a transition from Cluster 3 to Cluster 4 
is more probable (11.6%) than one from Cluster 3 to 2 (2.1%). This is because the aver-
age country in Cluster 3 has a series of solid structural indicators and debt tolerance is 
greater than in Cluster 2. Indeed, given that the average country in Cluster 4 has a debt 
of 84% of GDP, it would be possible to cross from cluster 3 to 4 with a near tripling of 
TABLE 2.3 Probability of Cluster Change
Cluster in Next Period
1 2 3 4
Cl
us
te
r i
n 
Cu
rr
en
t P
er
io
d 1 73.80% 15.70% 7.90% 2.60%
2 22.20% 65.30% 12.50% 0.00%
3 5.30% 2.10% 81.00% 11.60%
4 3.40% 0.00% 18.60% 78.00%
Source: IDB staff.
11 This does not imply that improvement in the structural indicators would not help to make the transition 
more rapid.
12 Later in this chapter it will be seen that this is precisely the case of successful countries of the region in 
the last two decades.
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debt. This implies that once Cluster 3 is reached, structural variables become fundamen-
tal when the time comes for “graduation” to Cluster 4.13 
It should be stressed that implementing policies aimed at improving economic fundamentals 
usually takes time, although there can be short-term benefits. For example, long processes of polit-
ical dialogue are often needed to shape reforms and the subsequent institutional adjustments for 
their implementation. However, although implementation can take time, the legal formulation of 
these reforms can yield short-term benefits, since it might create positive expectations on future 
economic performance. 
The next section explores the different options that the authorities in CAPDR might want to 
consider, including structural measures that could have positive effects on investors’ credit per-
ception. Debt adjustment policies combined with policies geared toward strengthening structural 
areas of the economy are examined. 
PENDING TASKS FOR CAPDR
Among the policy instruments that a country has to improve its creditworthiness, we find the 
possibility of changing its debt level and/or adjusting its economic fundamentals. In the previ-
ous section, we pointed out that reducing debt in the short term could create the necessary fis-
cal space to mitigate the adverse effects of a crisis and improve credit quality, while improving 
the country’s economic fundamentals would have longer-term effects. Therefore, the availabili-
ty of these two mechanisms to improve creditworthiness presents an interesting dilemma when 
choosing which combination of measures would be most appropriate. To understand the magni-
tude of the challenges among CAPDR countries and the possible approaches that might be used 
to confront them, the analysis that follows presents a quantitative assessment of the impact of 
different policies on credit perceptions.
On the basis of the results obtained from the estimations, two policy scenarios are evaluated. 
In the first, the only instrument of adjustment is the debt, while no other economic fundamentals 
are altered. The second scenario involves a combination of policy measures, including debt adjust-
ments and measures aimed at improving fundamentals. In both scenarios, the immediate impact 
on creditworthiness before debt adjustments is quantified. 
For Cluster 2 countries, such as Honduras, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala, implementing policies focused on debt reduction, in conjunction with improving eco-
nomic fundamentals, would yield important benefits (see Graph 2.8). In the first scenario, in which 
there is no structural improvement in the economy, lowering the debt by 1% of GDP, would lead to 
13 This does not imply that a deficient handling of the fiscal accounts cannot take a country from cluster 3 
to 2.
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an improvement in the creditworthiness index of 0.5%. If, on the other hand, this fiscal adjustment 
is accompanied by actions that improve economic fundamentals (for example where these econo-
mies climb up by one position in the ranking of each one of the structural variables),14 the effect on 
the IIR almost triples (1.4%).15 It is worth highlighting that for this group of countries, improving 
control of corruption would yield the highest benefits. Thus, implementing measures in the coun-
tries in the region that would improve this indicator16 to the Latin American average could yield an 
increase of 17.5% in the IIR for each 1% of GDP decline in debt. 
In the particular case of Nicaragua, a country which lies in Cluster 1, under scenario 1 credit-
worthiness would improve by 1.1% for each 1% of GDP adjustment in debt. This change has a higher 
yield than that for the other countries in the region, which belong to Cluster 2. In addition, the im-
pact on the IIR of accompanying the fiscal adjustment with improvements in structural factors such 
as the indicator of financial sector depth or industrial complexity of exports (so that the country 
climbs by one position in the ranking for each indicator17) is 1.6%.18 
It is important to note that Nicaragua has substantially reduced its debt levels in recent years 
with the help of Debt Forgiveness as a part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, 
and structural reforms such as the Fiscal Equity Law (2009) and Tax Harmonization Law (2012) as 
well as the elimination of exemptions to VAT for some goods consumed by high income households 
GRAPH 2.8  CAPDR in the Clusters 
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Source: IDB staff based on Institutional Investor Magazine and from the International Monetary Fund (2014).
a Owing to the lack of data for the IIR index in recent years, the Belize data is only for 2013.
14 This change assumes that the value of the indices for the other countries remains unchanged.
15 It is important to remember that the adjustment would have to be carried out in a period of five years.
16 In this exercise Costa Rica is excluded given that it is above the Latin American average for control of 
corruption.
17 Maintaining the value of the indicators for other countries.
18 The gains from structural reforms are lower in the cluster to which Nicaragua belongs to than for the clus-
ter to which the majority of CAPDR countries belong to.
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and changes in personal income tax (2012). By continuing with this pace of reforms and fiscal dis-
cipline,19 it might be expected that in the near future the country will cross the line to Cluster 2 of 
the classification, alongside the rest of its CAPDR peers. 
In Panama’s case, besides the positive effects which debt reduction entails, improvements in 
transparency and rule of law would contribute to raising the country’s credit rating. Panama is the 
only CAPDR country in Cluster 3, with a low level of debt and high (investment grade) credit rating 
and, unlike the rest of the countries of the region, it has a deep financial system. Yet it shares some 
of their deficiencies, such as a low level of industrial complexity and weak institutional indicators. 
The country should press ahead with reforms to preserve its privileged position and be able to 
draw closer to the countries of Cluster 4. Bad public debt management or a deterioration in eco-
nomic fundamentals could lead to scenarios in which a fall from investment grade could happen. 
Therefore, in the absence of improvements in fundamentals, an increase in debt of 1% of GDP 
would be reflected in a worsening of creditworthiness by 0.4%. If in addition there is a retreat in 
fundamentals (equivalent to a fall of one position in the ranking of each variable used here),20 the 
negative impact on creditworthiness would be of 0.6%.
Evaluating the results for the CAPDR countries, it is clear that setting guidelines for short- and 
long-term actions would benefit the region. While in the short term reductions in public debt would 
improve creditworthiness, the creation of a medium and long-term agenda to improve fundamen-
tals would translate into higher credit ratings, which would be reflected in a transition, for example, 
from Cluster 2 to Cluster 3. In summary, better fundamentals would allow access to financing at 
lower rates. In the future, besides counting on debt reduction as a policy instrument, the CAPDR 
agenda ought to be capable of identifying which medium and long-term structural measures would 
offer the highest returns. 
Although the region has achieved major advances in recent years (see Box 2.1), there is still 
plenty of room for improvement, particularly in terms of institutional capacity.21 For example, as 
Graph 2.9 shows all the countries of the region, with the exception of Costa Rica, are at least 44 po-
sitions below the typical Cluster 3 country (a total of 210 countries)22 in terms of the control of cor-
ruption. The region’s score in the index that approximates a country’s control of corruption could be 
improved with measures aimed at eliminating payments irregularities for imports, exports or con-
tracts that require any type of government authority as an intermediary. In addition, improving the 
use of public resources and the quality of auditing would raise the transparency indices. 
Strengthening accountability is another area in which the majority of these countries have 
room for institutional improvements. Four of the five countries of Cluster 2 lie at least 24 posi-
tions below the median of Cluster 3 (see Graph 2.10). Strengthening performance on this indicator 
19 In particular, it is necessary to implement reforms aimed at reducing the vulnerability to external factors 
and to complete the debt relief program.
20 Keeping the value of the indicators for all other countries.
21 Annex I presents a box which reflects the position of CAPDR in each element of institutional strength cov-
ered in this chapter.
22 Costa Rica is in a similar position to that of Cluster 3 countries for the control of corruption indicator.
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BOX 2.1 HISTORY OF REFORMS IN CAPDR AND THE CASE OF PANAMA
During the past 25 years, CAPDR governments carried out several reforms with the objective of 
improving their economic and institutional indicators that enhanced their IIR. Reforms have in-
volved different areas of the economy such as the financial, fiscal and international trade sectors. 
During this period, fiscal reforms were high on the agenda in El Salvador, Guatemala, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. The fiscal space created by these adjustments served 
as a buffer during the financial crisis in 2008–09, so that the region was not as severely affect-
ed by the economic downturn as it had been in previous crises. For example, the authorities of 
the region were in a position to expand expenditure with the aim to counterbalance the negative 
impacts of the crisis. In addition, some countries undertook structural reforms that allowed them 
to improve their fundamentals. For instance, Panama improved its financial depth index and, thus, 
became a leader in the region. Costa Rica, on the other hand, improved its industrial complexity 
index moving forward with expanding its trade openness and diversifying its exports. 
Furthermore, the countries in the region have also carried out structural reforms. Lora (2012) 
developed an index of structural reforms for the years of 1986, 1999 and 2009. This index in-
cludes: (i) trade policy data, where all the countries of the region benefited by implementing trade 
tariff reductions; (ii) finance policy, where El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras opened up their 
financial sector in recent years; (iii) tax policy, with a wide range of reforms in the last decade; 
and (iv) privatizations and labor legislation. Note that only marginal changes can be observed for 
the last two indicators. Hence, countries have implemented a set of reforms in the financial sector 
that has implied improving creditworthiness: the reform of the Organic Law of the Central Bank 
and the Worker Protection Law in Costa Rica (1995 y 2000, respectively), approval and imple-
mentation of the Organic Law for Supervision of the Financial System and the Commercial Banks 
Privatization Law (1990 and 1995, respectively) and the Law of Banks and their reforms in El 
Salvador (1999 y 2002), the Securities and Commodities Law, and the Law against money laun-
dering and other assets in Guatemala (1996 and 2001, respectively). Other achievements in the 
financial sector were the liberalization of interest rates, the reform of the Central Bank Law and 
Deposit Insurance Fund Law in Honduras (1992, 1996 y 2001, respectively); the Organic Law of 
the Central Bank, the Guarantee of Deposits in System Institutions Law and Pensions Supervision 
Law in Nicaragua (1999 y 2001, respectively); and the Securities Market Law and Law against as-
set laundering in the Dominican Republic (2000 and 2002, respectively).
Simultaneously, Panama pushed forward crucial changes, where the country has moved 
from suspending its debt servicing in 1988 to its current investment grade position in cluster 3. 
Compared to its regional competitors Panama enjoys a credit rating as well as growth rates well 
above those of the rest of the region. To achieve this, the country carried out a series of struc-
tural reforms, which laid the foundations for a significant improvement in the country’s risk rat-
ing. These reforms sought to reduce inflation, raise economic growth, improve social conditions 
and increase competitiveness. To meet these goals, budgetary cuts were carried out, the permit-
ted level of the fiscal deficit was capped, state enterprises were privatized, and tax institutions 
such as the general revenue office and the customs were strengthened. There were also reforms 
to social security, trade liberalization, improvements in financial regulation, and supervision and 
restructuring of government, among other things. The reforms brought the country to a privileged 
position in terms of credit standing. Panama is, not only a model to follow because of its high 
regional ranking, but also because these reforms were implemented in the past two decades.
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would be achieved through actions aimed at 
improving government procedures, both in-
ternal ones and those offered as services to 
the rest of the economy. Finally, a valuable 
step to improve accountability would be 
opening up to externally validated auditing 
processes.23
It is important to stress that there are 
countries in Latin America which have im-
proved their creditworthiness by imple-
menting both debt adjustments and policies 
focused on improving economic fundamen-
tals. For example, Colombia, Mexico and 
Peru belonged to Clusters 1 and 2 during 
the 1990s (see Graph 2.10). From 1997 
onwards, these countries began to imple-
ment fiscal consolidations and structural reforms which enabled them to achieve more solid fun-
damentals today, while allowing them to gain access to international debt markets at relatively low 
rates.24 Currently, all three are considered investment grade and are in Cluster 3 of our classifica-
tion. Though not synchronized, the trajectory of these three countries toward Cluster 3 showed the 
same pattern. Initially they focused on actions in the fiscal sphere, implementing measures such 
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23 Idem.
24 The reduction in financing costs could be attributed to at least two factors: (i) better creditworthiness and 
(ii) low international interest rates, a product of the recent expansive monetary policies in developed coun-
tries.
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TABLE 2.4 Reforms in Colombia, Mexico, and Peru
Sectorial and Structural Reforms Fiscal Reforms
1995 Countercyclical funds
1998 Financial Transactions Tax
Local Government restrictions
Decentralization of Administration of 
Education
2000
2001 Tax Restrictions to Local Governments
Consolidation of system of transfers of intra-
government revenues
Senator Elections 2003
Financial Sector
Consecutive Presidential Election
2005
Financial Sector 2009
2012 Tax Reform
Sectorial and Structural Reforms Fiscal Reforms
1998 Countercyclical funds
Regulatory Framework 2000 Law of Fiscal Responsibility
Law of Public Debt and Indebtedness ceilings
2002 Countercyclical Funds Reform through Automatic 
Stabilizers
Law of Career Reform
Financial System Reform
2006
2007 Public Sector Pensions Reform
Labor Reform, Professional Career System, 
Education, Competition and Regulation, 
Energy and Telecommunications
Elections and Politics
2010–2013 Fiscal Reform
Sectorial and Structural Reforms Fiscal Reforms
2000 Fiscal Responsability
Fiscal ceilings
Pluriannual Frameworks
Tax revenues stabilization
Regional Scope of Government 2001
Municipal Elections Period 2002 Increase to the tax revenues stabilization funds
Fiscal Transparency
Interest rates 2003
Law of Acreditations 2004
Source: IDB staff.
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as financial responsibility legislation, debt ceilings, and debt management, which constrained the 
level of public debt. While their fiscal positions improved, reforms were gradually incorporated to 
strengthen institutions and the financial sector (see Table 2.4). The combination of debt reduction 
and structural improvements enabled them to respond successfully to the last international crisis. 
Although the three countries increased spending, and therefore their debt ratios, their respective 
credit rating did not deteriorate at all and, in some cases, even improved.25 As these countries con-
tinue to work on their respective development agendas, they are success stories which could pro-
vide guidelines for the policy agendas of CAPDR countries.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of this chapter suggests two types of policy measures for CAPDR countries. First, 
it is reasonable to begin with quick gains26 on the fiscal side, given the greater return they 
generate on the IIR and their immediate impact. This type of fiscal action could also build 
confidence to facilitate subsequent areas of change for the longer term. However, it is import-
ant not to neglect measures specifically aimed at improving medium and long-term fundamen-
tals, which could have positive short-term effects through their impact on expectations. That 
is, it is recommendable for CAPDR countries to simultaneously emphasize progress in debt 
reduction policies and improvements in institutional quality, the productive structure and the 
financial sector. 
Second, the successful implementation of a program of fiscal and more structural measures 
could, after a time, enable the country to “graduate” from a particular type of cluster. In any case, 
countries of the region would most likely need to increase their creditworthiness from their cur-
rent level in order to shift to a better composition of fundamentals. In return, governments would 
be able to achieve a larger fiscal space at lower cost in periods of consolidation, while in times of 
crisis, they would enjoy greater flexibility of response. 
With focused efforts, CAPDR countries could achieve targets for consolidation and higher 
credit quality. Although the agenda of plans and measures to be implemented is broad, the re-
gion has advanced on many of its key points and is today the region in a better position than in the 
1990s, The steps taken by other Latin American countries, such as Colombia, Mexico or Peru, offer 
possible guidelines to follow. The CAPDR region has major strengths which, channeled in the right 
direction, provide opportunities for the development of its economies. 
 
25 Mexico’s case includes the issue in 2013 of a Perpetual Bond in the markets. At the same time, a set of 
second and third generation structural reforms were approved, which led to improvement in creditworthiness.
26 The comparison is with medium and long-term policies, such as control of corruption.
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THE NEW CHALLENGES OF 
GREATER FINANCIAL COMPLEXITY
Between 2008 and 2013 external financing flows to the region increased due to higher liquidity in international markets and low financing costs, and also thanks to the region’s stability relative to developed economies. These flows included foreign direct investment 
(FDI), bank loans, and in some cases, portfolio investment. This increase in international capital 
flows to CAPDR was associated with an accumulation of external debt (public and private), which 
rose from an average of 44% of GDP in 2008 to 50% of GDP in 2013 (see Graph 3.1). 
Although greater access to external resources can be beneficial (since it can complement in-
ternal savings and improve the viability of productive investment), it can also increase financial 
vulnerability if it leads to excessive risk-taking. For example, a depreciation of the exchange rate 
can trigger liquidity and solvency problems in the non-tradable sector whenever they build up lia-
bilities in foreign currency. This in turn may put at risk the ability to meet their obligations to other 
sectors, thereby affecting the chain of payments. This example illustrates that, in order to eval-
uate the financial vulnerability of the economy, it is important to determine not only the sectors in 
which debt is accumulating, but also the financial linkages between them, as this makes it possible 
to see the importance of one sector in the 
economy for the financing of others. 
Excessive dependence implies greater 
exposure to insolvency risks caused by shocks 
that affect the primary source of financing. In 
turn, the possibility of contagion increases as 
the integration between sectors rises. Thus, 
the liquidity management practices of mutu-
ally invested funds can create contagion ef-
fects if, for example, “leveraged” investors, 
facing demands for repayment, are forced to 
sell their assets- potentially at a lower market 
price than available under normal conditions. 
III
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This chapter offers a preliminary analysis of these vulnerabilities. The initial section analyzes 
the composition of sectorial balances in CAPDR before and after the crisis. The second part of this 
chapter then examines the vulnerabilities originating from credit and debit patterns between the 
main sectors of the economy and explores the options for mitigating them. 
CAPDR IN BALANCES: BEFORE AND AFTER
Besides being reflected in the increase in external debt, inflows to CAPDR also changed the com-
position of balances within the economy. The direct effect of the influx of flows from outside 
was a higher level of external liabilities. However, within the economy it produced a great va-
riety of operations between the different sectors, and this was reflected in their net positions. 
This chapter analyzes these by focusing on six broad sectors: the public sector, including its fi-
nancial and non-financial component; the private sector, consisting of firms and households; the 
financial sector; the monetary authority; and, finally, the external sector, formed by non-resi-
dents.1 Each of these sectors has a balance of assets and liabilities that, when consolidated (ex-
cluding the external sector), make up the aggregate balance of the economy. 
Graph 3.2 presents the structure of liabilities of the five domestic sectors for the average 
country of the region.2 For 2008 and 2013 period, two stylized facts can be identified. First, the 
imbalances in the public sector have led to an accumulation of public debt. Second, both banks and 
firms accumulated external liabilities. In this regard, for the average CAPDR country, public sector 
liabilities grew by 13% of GDP, from 42% to 55% of GDP.3 In addition, banks’ and firms’ liabilities 
rose by 9% and 20%, respectively. In the case of the banks, the external funds were mainly used 
to acquire public sector assets,4 which rose from 1.6% to 3.5% of GDP. Finally, firms increased their 
liabilities, with which they covered their operating costs and invested in both public sector and 
bank assets.5 
It is important to highlight the recent role that firms and the external sector have played 
in financing the rest of the economy. The private sector has increased its share of holdings of 
public liabilities (excluding external funds). Indeed, while external credit to the public sector rose 
from 20.8% to 26.7% of GDP, public securities held by firms increased from 9% to 15% of GDP, 
1 Financial institutions are consolidated with the monetary authority in accordance with the monetary sur-
vey manual of the International Monetary Fund.
2 Belize is excluded from the analysis due to limitations regarding the historical figures in this chapter.
3 This includes central government, government agencies, and the financial public sector. Belize is exclud-
ed from the analysis.
4 This pattern can be observed in Graph 3.2: liabilities of the public sector owned by the banking sector cor-
respond to the assets that banks obtained from the public sector.
5 The corporate sector balance does not allow visualizing the position within the sector, given that its net 
balance is zero. However, what is shown here is the position of the corporate sector compared to other sec-
tors and, therefore, its liabilities reflect firms’ demand for assets of the public sector, banking sector, etc.
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thereby continuing to be the second largest source of domestic financing for the public sector (see 
Graph 3.2). Similarly, the major component explaining the increase of banks’ liabilities was the ac-
quisition of financing supplied by firms, which rose from 19% to 21% of GDP. In contrast, external 
financing received by the banks increased from 5.3% to 5.6% of GDP. Finally, unlike other sectors, 
the liabilities of private corporations (see Graph 3.2) grew mainly through external financing credit 
lines, which increased from 4.0% to 7.5% of GDP between 2008–2013. 
There are two reasons why the financial health of the private sector is important for banks. The 
first mainly originates from the fact that local firms may be financing through short-term portfolio 
investment (from abroad) and depositing these external resources in national banks (therefore 
denominated in local currency). In a scenario in which market conditions worsen suddenly, large-
scale withdrawals may occur and liquidity problems could potentially arise. Second, variations in 
the exchange rate could also affect the balances of these firms in the case of a currency mismatch. 
In summary, various trends emerged as a result of the influx of international capital to CAPDR. 
First, the increase in external indebtedness has been mainly attributable to the public and banking 
sectors, though perhaps the more striking trend has been the greater role of the corporate sector 
as a recipient of external flows. Second, the inter-relationships between the external inflows to the 
region and the new financing dynamics within the domestic economy highlight, in particular, the 
growing role of firms as providers of financing to the rest of the economy. 
THE SECTORAL LINKS BEHIND THE SCENES 
It is clear that financial balance sheets offer vital information on the financial position of the 
economy, but there are certain vulnerabilities associated with credit and debit operations that 
are not captured by these net balances. The intensified financing operations between sectors 
could be increasing exposure to risks inherent in the greater inter-relationship between agents. 
GRAPH 3.2 CAPDR: Liabilities of the Sectoral Balances (% of GDP)
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Thus, the distinction between net balances and the evolution of credits and debits among 
agents is crucial, in particular in the context of the greater influx of external financing. In gen-
eral terms, the greater liquidity observed in the market could have stimulated the formation of 
new patterns of intermediation within the economy. This may have led to the creation of new 
financial agreements between market participants,6 increasing exposure to counterparty risks. 
The entirety of debit and credit operations between economic agents can be conceived as a 
grid of flows. From this viewpoint, credits and debits represent inter-sectoral links, which create a 
network in the economy. The greater the number of credits and debits between sectors, the greater 
the integration between its members and, therefore, each agent finds himself exposed to the risks 
and issues of his counterparties. The usefulness of representing the flows as a network is that it 
makes it easier to examine the degree to which the sectors of the economy are tied together and to 
extract from that the vulnerabilities to which they are exposed. 
Credit and debit flows can generate two kinds of vulnerabilities. The first arises from the allo-
cation and frequency of financing and investment operations. Through these, information on the 
concentration of flows between sectors is revealed, making the insolvency or illiquidity problems 
that may arise should shocks affect the pattern of flows immediately apparent. The second kind of 
vulnerability is associated with the use of flows in multiple secondary operations and the risks of 
contagion inherent in a more complex structure of flows.7 
Within the network of credit and debit operations, repeated transactions between some sec-
tors imply a greater concentration of flows. This is indeed a vulnerability for the network, as in the 
case of an adverse event in a sector with a high level of concentration, a substantive reduction in 
flows would seriously affect financing for the rest of the economy.8 Moreover, the linkages between 
sectors make it possible to identify when one sector in the economy is key for the financing of an-
other. Thus, higher concentration implies greater exposure to insolvency risks caused by shocks to 
the primary source of financing. 
On the other hand, the increase in financing linkages can carry risks associated with bad man-
agement of assets and contagion. Inter-sectoral flows are similar to bank deposits, in which a sum 
of deposits is converted into multiple loan contracts. After entering a sector, flows splinter and be-
come part of other intra- and inter-sectoral operations. These flows have the positive trait of gener-
ating multiplier effects by increasing the supply of funds in the economy. However, when they are 
6 With the aim of increasing the return on external flows through financial intermediation, the banks created 
and employed new instruments such as securitized assets, guarantees, credit notes, mutual funds or notes 
collateralized by other instruments. These securities have been acquired, in their turn, by the private sector 
and re-used as financial investments.
7 An example of this is the use on the part of the private financial and non-financial sector of new instru-
ments and financing and investment mechanisms not covered by prudential regulation and which might not 
be appropriately backed.
8 The concentration relationship is normally linked to measures of centrality. The effects that an adverse shock 
in sectors with high concentration would have on the rest of the economy have been explored, for instance, 
by Allen and Gale (2000), Babus (2014), Acemoglu (2012), Acemoglu et al. (2013), and Elliot et al. (2014).
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not adequately backed or regulated, adverse events can generate multiplier effects in the opposite 
direction; that is, they can transmit the negative effects to all sectors of the economy. 
The extent to which CAPDR countries are exposed to these risks depends on the dynamics of 
the credit and debit flows between sectors. The evolution of the network of credit and debit op-
erations determines where the funds come from and where they have been directed. They also 
track the volume of the financing operations between sectors. The following section focuses on de-
scribing the main characteristics of the network of flows in CAPDR and quantifies the degree of ex-
posure to these vulnerabilities. 
THE FLOWS IN CAPDR: CHALLENGES AND POLICY OPTIONS 
Graph 3.3 depicts the flows of funds between sectors of the economy between 2008 and 2013. 
As before, the figures summarize the values for the average economy in CAPDR. The boxes in-
dicate the liabilities in these two years, while the arrows show the flows of credits and debits 
between sectors. 
The following patterns in CAPDR can be extracted from the information shown in the diagram: 
a. Firms were net recipients of financing. Between 2008 and 2013, firms in the region re-
ceived a (net) average inflow of 6.1% of GDP. Of this, 36% originated from banks, to give 
GRAPH 3.3 Average Financing Flows in CAPDR 2008–2013 (% of GDP)
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net credits totaling 2.2% of GDP; and gross external flows to finance firms doubled be-
tween 2008 and 2013, accounting for 5.1% of GDP. It is worth stressing that external fi-
nancing came through contracts or commercial agreements, with portfolio investment only 
common in countries with a more integrated financial system, such as Panama. 
b. The public sector of the average CAPDR economy increased its net debt. Between 
2008 and 2013, net flows to the public sector amounted to almost 13.3% of GDP,9 increas-
ing its liabilities from 41.5% to 54.8% of GDP. Until 2010, the public sectors of the region 
distributed their liabilities between bank credit lines, local market instruments and financ-
ing from international financial organizations. After 2010, although the local market contin-
ued to be the main provider of funds, the public sector absorbed, on average, about 6.9% 
of GDP10 from abroad, equivalent to 24.7% of external credit. The latter was either in the 
form of official development assistance, other credit agreements11 or portfolio investment.12
c. The banking sector remained a net lender in the economy. In order to finance their 
operations, on average, banks received flows from overseas of 5.8% of GDP, doubling the 
amount observed before the crisis. Nevertheless, the domestic market continues to be 
the main source of financing: firms deposited 6.4% of GDP, households about 6%, the 
monetary authority 2.3% and the public sector 1.6%. In this regard, the main mechanism 
for raising funds was the issuance of securities in domestic markets. In addition, inter-
bank lending became a recurrent source to meet repayments on short-term liabilities.13 
Meanwhile, credit granted by banks to the rest of the economy totaled 29% of GDP, main-
ly distributed to firms (8.5% of GDP) and households (8.6% of GDP).
In addition, the analysis shows that in the average CAPDR country there is a significant con-
centration of flows in the banking and public sectors.14 This is quite evident in the case of the banks, 
given that their role as financial intermediaries means they channel a large volume of flows to the 
entire economy. The importance of the public sector is associated with the government’s role as a 
supplier of safe assets to banks and the rest of the private sector. Moreover, the public banks, con-
tribute to higher concentration of the public sector, given the amount of credit and debit operations 
9 It is worth highlighting that this pattern has not been uniform: for instance, Nicaragua has had negative net 
flows throughout this period; however, in the other countries this sector stands out as a net recipient of flows.
10 Gross flows from abroad.
11 They include loans, credit cards, purchase and sale agreements for goods and services documented in the 
financial account of the balance of payments as “other financing”.
12 Flows of a more volatile nature, such as portfolio investment, were captured by those countries with ac-
cess to the markets. By contrast, financing schemes different to portfolio investment were commonly used 
in all countries of the region.
13 Interbank lending also showed higher activity. However, this is not observable in the aggregated bank-
ing balance. On average, from 2009 on, the region made 3.5 times more use of bank credit than in 2008 
and 2009.
14 Calculations regarding the concentration of flows uses the methodology of networks; for more on it see 
the Annex II.
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they have with the private sector.15 In fact the index of relative importance confirms their high 
dependency on both the banking and public sectors.16 The index is derived from information on 
credits and debits, the number of links and the volume of operations. It is constructed to assign a 
higher relative (or systemic) importance to a sector the more it intervenes in credit and debit trans-
actions. Graph 3.4 shows the evolution of this indicator for the average CAPDR country between 
2008 and 2013. The graph also includes the index for Colombia,17 a benchmark for the region. 
Colombia suits this task particularly well since its financial system has developed substantially over 
the past decade. In addition, it has carried out important fiscal consolidation policies and pruden-
tial reforms. As can be observed in the graph, the current flow structure of CAPDR shows an excep-
tional concentration in the public and banking sectors. In contrast, Colombia has a relatively more 
uniform systemic importance across sectors, apart from the household sector. However, it should 
be stressed that the systemic importance of the banking sector in CAPDR has tended to diminish 
and is closer to the level seen in Colombia for 2013. The same graph also reveals some other dif-
ferences between the region and Colombia. One is the greater systemic importance of the public 
sector in CAPDR than in Colombia. As Graph 3.5 shows, this public sector dominance is most acute 
in countries with less developed financial and capital markets,18 such as Honduras and Nicaragua. 
Panama is the only country in the region with a private sector with systemic importance similar 
to that of other sectors. This fact is consistent with the indicators of firms’ and households’ access 
15 Public banks are relatively small in CAPDR, for example, the liabilities in the average CAPDR country are 
less than 3.5% of GDP; in flows, the figure for these credits is less than 1% of GDP.
16 A sector with great relative importance within the system of flows would have index values close to 1 while 
the least important would be closer to zero.
17 It takes into consideration information on flows between 2012 and 2013. Colombia is a natural case for a 
regional benchmark. On the one hand it is a country which has developed its financial system in the last de-
cade and in addition it has strengthened its fiscal sector through prudential reforms.
18 This refers to the absence of mechanisms/instruments of non-bank intermediation (mainly the stock market).
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to credit and investment opportunities in 
Panama.19 
Finally, the flow chart provides us with 
an indicator of the ease at which a nega-
tive shock disseminates to the rest of the 
economy, and this reveals that the intensi-
fication of credit and debit operations has 
led to a higher propensity to contagion from 
negative shocks. As noted above, the flows 
initially received by one sector are sub-
sequently used in operations with other 
economic agents, thus increasing the in-
tra-sectoral and inter-sectoral ties. To mea-
sure the exposure to negative shocks, an 
indicator is used to quantify the number of 
times flows have been transferred between sectors. This index shows that in CAPDR all the sectors 
of the economy, on average, almost doubled their contagion propensity (see Graph 3.6). Between 
2008 and 2013, what stands out is the remarkable increase in the exposure of the banking sector, 
which almost tripled its vulnerability to contagion. In the same way, the indicator confirms that the 
more inter-related sectors are the most exposed, followed by sectors with a greater number of links 
with sectors of systemic importance.20 
19 The index consists of a weighted average of three known centrality measures. For further information on 
these measures, see the Annex II. The index goes from zero to one hundred, in which zero represents no 
probability of contagion and one hundred certain contagion.
20 In other words, a sector’s speed of contagion rises when it is more linked to the banking and the pub-
lic sector.
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VULNERABILITIES… THE EFFECTS OF SHOCKS IN EXTERNAL FLOWS
The impact on CAPDR of these levels of concentration of flows and propensity to contagion can 
be analyzed by using a stress test on the network of flows. In this test, the flows that the do-
mestic economy receives from the external sector are reduced from their current level to their 
2008 level (see Box 3.1 for more details).21 This sudden reduction in flows affects all the sec-
tors that normally find financing from abroad. Assuming that economic agents cannot easily 
adjust their financing needs, the demand for domestic credit would increase. Since the bank-
ing sector is the main provider of domes-
tic financing but cannot obtain resources 
from abroad, it seeks funds from the mon-
etary authority, while reducing, to some 
degree, its credit lines to the private sec-
tor. Ultimately, it is the public sector that 
covers the liquidity problem by supplying 
resources to the economy (for example, to 
firms through the public banks). Graph 3.7 
shows the fiscal cost incurred as a result 
of a reduction in external flows by differ-
ent percentages,22 ranging from 10% to 
100%. We find that the fiscal cost of keep-
ing the network functioning would be be-
tween 0.9% and 3.0% of GDP, depending 
on the shock. 
The results of the stress test also show 
that the main channels of transmission to 
the economy are those related to banking 
and public sectors. First, in terms of their 
contribution to the fiscal cost, these sec-
tors seem to carry the largest share. In fact, 
the financial transactions between these 
two sectors account for almost 28% of the 
total cost (see Graph 3.8). Another 38% 
is caused by the banking sector’s multiple 
links with the rest of the economy. About 
21 The exercise is replicated for the case in which the flows are reduced only by 90% from this first scenar-
io. Later the replication is extended as far as 10%.
22 The reduction by 100% represents a shock, which takes external flows to levels prior to the recession, 
while 10% represents a contraction in the flows of only 10%.
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12% originates from the dependence of 
other sectors on the government. A further 
17% reflects the monetary effect of external 
flows and 5.7% accounts for the linkages 
between the remaining sectors. It is worth 
noting that without double-counting, and 
aggregating the costs separately for each 
sector, the role of the private sector stands 
out (as well as the public and banking sec-
tors), accounting for around 12% of the total 
cost of the reduction of external flows (see 
Graph 3.9).23
23 Private sector here refers to firms (6.8%) and households (5.1%).
BOX 3.1 STRESS TEST: SHOCK TO FLOWS FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY
The structure of flows is exposed to a shock which reduces the availability of external financing to 
levels observed before the recession. Information on flows and balances from 2008 is used as a 
starting point as this was the point at which financial markets began to show signs of instability. 
Until the final quarter of 2008 financial conditions remained relatively normal and it was only with 
the fall of Lehman that conditions of stress applied. 
The stress test assumes that after the shock each sector keeps its financing needs the same. 
Since each sector is tied to another through debits and credits, the shock propagates simultaneous-
ly to every member that has received external flows. The analysis suggests that the effects of the 
shock would be disseminated principally through the banking sector since it has links with each one 
of the other sectors. However, the shock would create an analogous dynamic beginning from the pri-
vate or public sector when portfolio investment in the economy contracts. 
The dynamic in which the contagion takes place could be the following: after the shock the 
banking sector is obliged to reduce credit to the economy as a result of the contraction in external 
financing. At the same time, the public sector sees its external sources of funds restricted and trans-
fers its needs to the banking sector. Meanwhile the private sector turns to the banks, as it normally 
does, for lines of credit. This continues to occur until the latter is not able to meet the demand. To 
try to cover the demand, the banks first turn to interbank credit and then to the monetary author-
ity to obtain funds, but only until its balance is adjusted. When this occurs, the private sector re-
sorts to the public banks. To compensate for what is lacking, the public banks increase their lines 
of credit but not without first accessing financing from the monetary authority or transfers from the 
central government. These effects are greater when the flows have been transferred multiple times 
between sectors, whether in the form of loans or investments. In any case, owing to the high de-
pendence on the public sector, what’s lacking ultimately falls on it.
(continued on next page)
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By contrast, it is evident that the costs 
of a reduction in external financing could 
be lower if the levels of concentration be-
tween sectors were reduced (Graph 3.10). 
This second test consists of a simulation 
aimed at lowering the fiscal costs in case of 
a reduction of external financing. The sim-
ulation rebalances the flow of credits and 
debits among sectors until a new network is 
obtained (for more details, see the Annex). 
This network is more resilient to cuts in ex-
ternal financing because the new pattern of 
linkages makes the respective sectors them 
more capable of satisfying a greater per-
centage of the financing needs. Improving 
GRAPH 3.10  Fiscal Cost After the Shock: CAPDR and 
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the internal capacity to cope with a shock reduces the costs for the public sector. Three lessons 
emerge from this last stress test. First, moving to a less concentrated pattern of flows distributes 
shocks more uniformly between sectors and reduces the direct costs for the public sector; there-
fore, a uniform increase in debits and credits between all the sectors lessens the concentration and 
mitigates the effects of a negative external shock. Second, the systemic importance of the banking 
sector is confirmed and, consequently, the importance of effectively monitoring and regulating the 
sector in order to reduce its vulnerabilities. Third, if external flows increase, the monetary authority 
becomes more important as the agent that safeguards the system’s stability. This reflects the im-
portant role of the monetary authority as a manager of net external assets of the economy.24 
Enhancing macroprudential regulation in the financial sector is an effective way of mitigating 
vulnerabilities associated with the concentration of flows. Regarding the multi-sectoral dimension, 
the tasks consist of identifying institutions of (relative) systemic importance within each sector 
and implementing measures that reflect the degree to which they could affect the stability of the 
system. Various criteria can be used to identify the institutions of highest importance, and the in-
dicator of concentration of flows is one of them. The macroprudential approach suggests, on the 
one hand, that to reduce the concentration of flows it is necessary to allow other agents in the 
economy to have access to financing and investment mechanisms. On the other hand, to mitigate 
risks arising from the multiplication of financial transactions, policies to assure monitoring and 
capital adequacy are necessary.25 Hence, there must be strict rules on capital reserves (including 
for the non-financial private sector) which, to a degree, fall within the most recent Basel guidelines. 
CAPDR could benefit from the experience of other countries, such as Colombia, Peru and Mexico, 
which offer possible paths for addressing these challenges (see Box 3.2 and the Annex II). 
A further factor for consideration is the growth of interbank credit, which also represents a 
shock amplifier. The interbank market is an important mechanism for the distribution of excess li-
quidity among financial entities, since it can provide coverage for institutions (banks) experiencing 
difficulties meeting their short-term liabilities.26 Its correct functioning is important to guarantee fi-
nancial intermediaries’ access to sources of liquidity so that they can make financing available for 
households and firms. However, as was seen during the 2008–09 financial crisis, a shock to any of 
the participants in the interbank market can affect the pattern of flows, reduce the availability of 
funds, and interrupt the provision of liquidity, especially to the banks affected directly by the shock. 
Furthermore, while larger entities tend to obtain finance from a larger number of creditors, the small 
ones do not, thus making them the most vulnerable to shocks that affect the banking system.27
24 This would be achieved if the external sector increases its systemic importance by approximately the same 
amount as the monetary authority.
25 Equity financing, opposed to debt, is a natural stabilizer as its value adjusts automatically after a shock. 
This result suggests the convenience of limiting policies (either fiscal or regulatory) that give advantages to 
debt over equity, either fiscal or regulatory. 
26 Bhattacharya and Gale (1985), Freixas et al. (2010), Acharya et al. (2012).
27 Allen and Gale (2000).
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BOX 3.2 PRUDENTIAL MEASURES IN COLOMBIA, MEXICO AND PERU
In Latin America, Colombia, Mexico and Peru have benefited from the implementation of pruden-
tial regulations. Just as in other countries which are recipients of flows, the recent crisis generat-
ed important changes in the patterns of flows in these three countries and therefore in sectoral 
balances. However, they have been able to respond satisfactorily to them so far. 
CAPDR could reduce its vulnerabilities by implementing similar measures to those carried out 
in these countries. To lessen concentration, the creation of non-bank societies with intermediation 
services of limited purpose (Sofol), and from which banks themselves have been restricted, has 
been encouraged. Their aim is to provide the financial system with institutions that increase the 
alternatives and the financing flows for economic agents. Among these societies are found mort-
gage lenders, educational loan institutions, household credit and credit to micro and small firms. 
Meanwhile, to reduce the risks of contagion and its fiscal effects, it is important to have pru-
dential regulation for international banks and repatriation of capital. In this regard, Mexico has 
required international banks to establish themselves as a subsidiary rather than a branch, there-
by minimizing the exit of resources to the matrix. In addition, in Colombia, Peru and Mexico the 
gradual adoption of the Basel principles I and II has been rewarded by high levels of regulato-
ry capital. It should be stressed that at present CAPDR is not very far from the capital adequacy 
levels suggested by Basel. However, it is important that the region assimilates the Basel Accords 
in order to reduce the vulnerabilities of the financial system in general. The risk mitigation agen-
da is not static and therefore permanent monitoring of market conditions is preferable. For this 
reason Colombia, Peru and Mexico are proceeding to improve their financial regulation criteria 
with the aim of extending them across the multi-sectoral, macroprudential field and making them 
more suitable for the post-crisis financial reality. Graph R2.2 points out some of these elements.
(continued on next page)
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Given the relative importance of the public sector in CAPDR, an all-encompassing manage-
ment of the government’s liabilities is crucial to reduce vulnerabilities in the economy. Under the 
multi-sectoral approach, the authorities should recognize that fiscal policy is the cornerstone of 
a general financial stability framework. Similarly, in CAPDR the public sector is the largest player 
in local financial markets and its domestic liabilities are the benchmark for risk-free interest rates 
in each of the financial systems. For these reasons, governments must take into account the im-
pact of fiscal policy on the stability of the financial system. Concretely, fiscal policy should not 
only aim to be counter-cyclical, but also take into account the importance of strengthening fiscal 
buffers, as they will provide CAPDR with better capacities to cope with shocks affecting the fi-
nancial sector. 
CONCLUSIONS
During the years following the recent financial crisis, the convergence of diverse factors—both 
internal and external -in many ways predetermined the economic performance of CAPDR, a re-
gion that is more open than ever to international markets. In these years, the region experienced 
a boom in the attraction of financing flows from overseas. Like potential external shocks, these 
BOX 3.2 PRUDENTIAL MEASURES IN COLOMBIA, MEXICO, AND PERU (continued)
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flows are key determinants of the behavior of the main macroeconomic variables. In this light, 
their effects represent a constant policy challenge for the economic authorities. 
There is no doubt that the inflow of external funds has been beneficial, and so far the economy 
has not shown any notable deterioration in its balances, but inadequate management of the in-
ter-sectoral flows could lead to instability. In addition, higher liquidity resulting from the external 
flows has facilitated greater activity in credit and debit operations between market participants, 
and with this, the emergence of certain vulnerabilities, which are not immediately evident in the 
balances. In this regard, the analysis presented here shows that the influx of funds from abroad has 
effectively modified credit and debit patterns in the entire region, leading to vulnerability in some 
cases. These vulnerabilities, associated with the intensification in financial operations and with the 
presence of sectors of high systemic importance, could eventually lead to imbalances that could ul-
timately spread negative effects through the rest of the economy. 
The lessons of this chapter are that the intensification of financial relationships between sec-
tors must be accompanied by a multi-sectoral agenda for action. A multi-sectoral approach would 
make it possible to achieve coordinated results and confront vulnerabilities that might lead to sce-
narios of instability and risk aversion. In addition, with a policy framework of this kind, countries of 
the region could benefit by bolstering investor confidence and thereby enhancing creditworthiness. 
The policy agenda in CAPDR should broaden its scope, to take heed of the risk that imbalances in 
one particular sector might have damaging effects on the rest of the economy. 
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IF THE WINDS WERE TO 
CHANGE? GROWTH 
SCENARIOS FOR THE REGION
The prospects for CAPDR have improved thanks to the recovery trends in the United States, as well as the fall in oil prices. It is expected that the former will benefit the exports and remittance inflows in the region. Moreover, since CAPDR countries are net oil importers, 
the fall in oil prices should also have positive effects, helping to improve the current account and 
lessen inflationary pressures.1 Low oil prices also provide an opportunity to reduce energy subsi-
dies, therefore, improving the fiscal position. 
In spite of this positive outlook, there remain risks that need to be considered. In particular, 
the withdrawal of monetary stimulus in the United States could cause greater volatility in capital 
markets and push up the costs of external resources, which have become important sources of fi-
nancing for the region. Recent history shows that at times of financial turbulence, investors can 
suddenly become more risk averse and seek refuge in assets of economies with stronger fundamen-
tals (a phenomenon known as flight-to-quality), with serious repercussions for emerging markets.2 
As it can be seen in panel A of Graph 4.1, increases in financial volatility (measured by the VIX3 
volatility index) during crisis periods tend to be accompanied by a rise in the premium over the in-
terest rate on United States Treasury bonds (the international risk-free rate) that emerging markets 
have to pay to obtain financing in international markets. The increasing integration of the region in 
capital markets exposes it to this type of risk, as demonstrated during the international financial 
crisis (see Graph 4.1, panel B).
There is also uncertainty about the duration of lower oil prices. The potential impact of lower 
oil revenues on political stability in some of the main oil producing countries could trigger changes 
IV
1 This would give central banks flexibility in policy-making.
2 See, for instance, Calvo (1999) for a theoretical formulation of how information asymmetries on the part 
of investors can cause reversals in capital flows to emerging markets for reasons unrelated to their econom-
ic fundamentals.
3 The VIX is an indicator, which measures the confidence of investors in capital markets.
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in oil supply and therefore in prices. Moreover, it remains plausible that the weak performance of 
other economic zones in the world (especially Europe) may damage growth in the United States 
and the region. 
In this context, it is useful to examine the impact on regional growth of an increase in the oil 
price, greater volatility in financial markets, and weaker growth performance in the United States. 
To quantify the impact of each of these risks, this chapter estimates an econometric model of the 
average regional growth4 as a function of the behavior of the relevant exogenous variables: eco-
nomic growth in the US, the oil price, and international financial conditions (captured by the VIX 
volatility index).5 The results show the implications of specific scenarios in the external environ-
ment on growth in CAPDR for the next two years. 
GRAPH 4.1 Financial Shocks and Capital Flows
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4 The growth rates of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, and the Dominican Republic were 
considered, representing 87% of regional GDP.
5 See Annex III for details of the model employed.
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As a starting point, the baseline scenario is as follows: oil prices gradually recover, to reach 
US$69 per barrel (dpb) in 2017;6 growth in the United States is 3.6%, 3.3% and 3.1% in 2015, 2016 
y 2017, respectively; and financial volatility (measured by the VIX index) shows a similar evolution 
to 2012-2014 (see Graph 4.2). This baseline scenario is contrasted with four stress scenarios. In the 
first, the assumption is that the oil price rises at a faster pace between 2015 and 2017 (see Graph 
4.2, panel A), to reach US$85 at the end of 2017. In the second, it is assumed that financial vola-
tility increases in a similar way to the period of adjustment and negotiation over the Greek debt in 
2011 and 2012 (see Graph 4.2, panel B). The third stress scenario assumes that growth in the United 
States economy slowdowns as a result of the weak performance of the Euro Zone and China, re-
ducing annual growth, on average, by 0.4 percentage points in 2015-2017 (see Graph 4.2, panel C).7 
Finally, in a fourth scenario, the three shocks described above are combined. 
Graph 4.3 presents the results of the different scenarios. In the first one, a more rapid than 
expected recovery in the oil price compares unfavorably with the baseline scenario, with growth 
rates for the region reduced by 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points in 2015 and 2016, respectively. In 
this case, economic activity of the region would expand 3.6% by 2016, compared to 4.1% in the 
baseline.
In the second scenario, a sudden increase in volatility would negatively affect economic 
growth in CAPDR. The peaks in volatility would translate into GDP growth that is 0.6 percentage 
points below the baseline in 2015 (see Graph 4.3). Given that it is assumed that the greater vola-
tility would continue until 2016, this negative effect would lower the region’s average growth from 
4.1% to 3.4.
In the third scenario, lower growth rates in the US would have an important impact on the re-
gion in both 2015 and 2016. As shown in Graph 4.3, the potential impact of an average reduction 
of 0.4 percentage points in the growth of the United States (main trading partner of the region) 
would be a growth slowdown of 0.5 percentage points in 2015, compared to the baseline. This ef-
fect would be accentuated in 2016, with the model projecting growth 3.3%, 0.8 percentage points 
below the baseline.
Finally, the least optimistic scenario in which the three shocks hit the region simultaneously, 
economic growth is reduced to 3.2% in 2015, and the slowdown would become more acute in 2016 
with a rate close to 2.9% (less than the growth rates recorded in 2013–2014). The reduced dyna-
mism of the U.S. economy would explain 60% of the potential impact in this scenario; higher oil 
prices 28%; and the increased volatility 12%. 
What can be learned from these scenarios? Although the region is currently benefiting from 
favorable tail winds due to the US recovery and low oil prices, there are risks that could curtail 
growth. A new round of global economic instability would have serious consequences for growth 
6 This path is consistent with the most recent projections by the World Bank.
7 This potential impact was calculated by simulating a deepening of the European recession and employing a 
Global Vector Auto-Regression (GVAR) model, which captures trade and financial linkages between advanced 
economies and Latin America, developed in Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2012).
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of the economies of the region and, given the limited space for a counter-cyclical fiscal policy as a 
consequence of higher levels of debt, the recovery process could be even slower and more complex. 
These results highlight the importance of taking advantage of the favorable environment to 
regain fiscal space, while implementing policies to strengthen the region’s growth in the medium- 
and long-term. CAPDR might be tempted to delay the process of fiscal consolidation in the current 
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favorable external environment, as happened in the case of some Latin American commodity-ex-
porting economies during the price boom of recent years, but this would be a mistake. 
This chapter highlights how important it is for CAPDR countries to further reduce their vul-
nerability to changes in the external outlook, reinforcing the arguments of earlier chapters. In line 
with the analysis in Chapter 2, it suggests that the key to building more resilient economies is to 
keep strengthening policy frameworks, to assure positive risk perceptions and access to low cost 
financing. Such policies will enable countries to implement counter-cyclical measures to mitigate 
the harmful effects of external shocks. Moreover, the results of this chapter support the findings of 
Chapter 3, in stressing the need to design macro-prudential regulation that takes into account the 
increased exposure of different sectors of the economy to external indebtedness, as well as the 
greater ties amongst them. As discussed in Chapter 3, this demands progress in the implementa-
tion of the recommendations of the Basel accords, such as the establishment of strict rules on cap-
ital reserves (including for the non-financial private sector). Similarly, the evidence here supports 
strategies aimed at monitoring fiscal and debt positions to strengthen buffers in the region and thus 
mitigate the impact of potential future crises. 
GRAPH 4.3 Impact of External Scenarios on the Region
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2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
4.5%
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Base Scenario Higher Oil Price Scenario Higher Volatility Scenario
Lower USA Economic Growth Scenario Combined Scenario
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Annual GDP Rate of CAPDR*
4.7
4.5 4.6
3.7
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3.53.6
4.1
3.6
3.4
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2.9
Source: IDB staff estimates after 2014. IMF World Economic Outlook for historical data.
Note: * average growth includes Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama and Dominican Republic, which account for 87% of 
regional GDP. 
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ANNEXES
ANNEX I
The relationship between credit rating and the IIR is generated by means of a map, which as-
signs 1 to an Aaa rating and 0 to Caa3. The following table shows these equivalences:
Estimations Methodology
General specification of the model: the 
model is constructed on the basis of the 
specification proposed by Bannister et al. 
(2011). The specifications used for this 
chapter expand the initial estimation by 
means of a set of variables which signifi-
cantly contribute to approximating the eco-
nomic fundamentals:
 ,
where z corresponds to the set of controls 
in Bannister et al. (2011) and x includes 
factors of institutional strength, industrial 
complexity (Index of Export Complexity) 
and financial depth (liquid liabilities in 
the balance of payments as a percentage 
of GDP).
To gauge the degree of correlation 
between the variables of institutional 
strength, the Kaufman World Wide 
TABLE AI.1  Credit Rating Equivalence between 
Moody’s and IIR
Rating IIR
Aaa 90.04
Aa1 86.27
Aa2 82.5
Aa3 78.74
A1 74.97
A2 71.2
A3 67.43
Baa1 63.67
Baa2 59.9
Baa3 56.13
Ba1 52.36
Ba2 48.6
Ba3 44.83
B1 41.06
B2 37.29
B3 33.53
Caa1 29.76
Caa2 25.99
Caa3 22.23
Source: Elaborated by IDB staff with data from Moody’s and the 
Institutional Investor Magazine.
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Governance Indicators indices were taken into consideration and submitted to a decomposition of 
principal components. As can be seen in Table A2, around 75% of the information is accumulated 
in the first two components with the priority distribution as indicated there. The relative weight of 
each factor, an important variable for the selection of the factors to be included in the estimations, 
is also important. For the rest of the estimations, annual series from 1989 until 2013 are used in 
five-yearly averages for each one of the series. 
Generation of clusters. With the five-year series a k-means method is used based on debt as a 
percentage of GDP and the Institutional Investor Rating (IIR), using the measure L2. 
Indicators of strength by clusters. The table below reflects the relative position of CAPDR for 
each aspect of Institutional Strength. 
Measurement of the effects by clusters. The general formulation is extended by means of dum-
my variables, D, indicating membership to each cluster.
 .
Estimation method. Since a specification of fixed effects in a dynamic panel is involved, var-
ious methods are explored, among them the Fixed Effects, Least Squares, Arellano-Bond re-
gression (1991) and Arellano-Bover (1995). As a greater number of countries than periods are 
available, the instruments option in a Generalized Method of Moments results in more consis-
tent estimations, and therefore the Arellano-Bover (1995) results are those used in the body 
of the document. Table A4 shows a summary of results from the estimations, using Arellano-
Bover (1995):
Analysis of non-linearities. With the aim of studying whether there are different effects be-
tween clusters for our proxies of economic fundamentals, first a t-test of means between clus-
ters and factors was elaborated. Table AE1 shows the results of these tests. The tests reflect the 
fact that there are statistically significant differences between clusters for some of the factors 
used, which might suggest the existence of non-linear effects between clusters. To corroborate 
this, a series of estimations were carried out, including interaction of debt and IIR dummies. 
To generate the debt dummy (d), the average between the figure which separates cluster 1 and 
2 and that which separates cluster 3 y 4 was used. The same method was used to generate the 
dummy (i) of the IIR. The following set of estimations was carried out:
 ,
 .
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The group of estimations below explores whether belonging to each cluster is correlated with 
any non-linear effect. Since there are k=2 debt groups and j=2 IIR groups, 22 possibilities are gener-
ated reflecting each cluster:
 .
TABLE AI.2 Estimation of Principal Components
Correlation explained by principal component
Relative weight of factors within the principal 
components 
Principal components/
correlation
Number of obs. 342
Number of comp. 9
Trace 9
Rho 1
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 5.48 4.38 0.61 0.61
Comp2 1.10 0.29 0.12 0.73
Comp3 0.81 0.20 0.09 0.82
Comp4 0.61 0.22 0.07 0.89
Comp5 0.39 0.09 0.04 0.93
Comp6 0.30 0.07 0.03 0.97
Comp7 0.23 0.19 0.03 0.99
Comp8 0.04 0.01 0.00 1.00
Comp9 0.03 — 0.00 1.00
Factor Component 1 Component 2
Corruption 0.4089 –0.0014
Rule of law 0.4123 –0.0053
Accountability 0.3611 –0.1699
Security 0.3572 0.0205
Transparency 0.4115 –0.0106
Complexity 0.3493 –0.1414
Financial depth 0.2043 0.4999
Financial 
Integration
0.0927 0.7956
GRAPH AI.1 CAPDR During 1989
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Source: IDB Staff based on data from Institutional Investor Magazine and from the International Monetary Fund (2014).
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Finally, non-linear continuous effects between the debt and factors were tested as well as be-
tween the IIR and factors:
 ,
 .
GRAPH AI.3 CAPDR During 2013
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Source: IDB Staff based on data from Institutional Investor Magazine and from the International Monetary Fund (2014).
GRAPH AI.2 CAPDR During 2007
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Source: IDB Staff based on data from Institutional Investor Magazine and from the International Monetary Fund (2014).
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GRAPH AI.4 Position of CAPDR on Each Indicator of Institutional Strength in Relation to the Median of Cluster 3
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Source: IDB Staff based on data from Worldwide Governance Indicators (2014).
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TABLE AI.3 Estimations by Clusters
Variable Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Lag of IIR 0.434**
–5.77
0.489**
–7.13
0.539**
–7.77
0.390**
–4.82
Debt –0.329**
(–6.08)
–0.309**
(–5.98)
–0.375**
(–6.61)
–0.386**
(–7.15)
Square debt 0.00149*
–4.52
0.00133*
–4.21
0.00164*
–4.81
0.00173*
–5.23
GDP per capita 0.000104*
–2.07
0.000109*
–2.24
0.000132*
–2.47
0.000125*
–2.49
Inflation –8.701**
(–4.11)
–6.969**
(–3.32)
–8.833**
(–3.71)
–9.973**
(–4.38)
Default –8.740**
(–5.26)
–8.936**
(–5.46)
–9.557**
(–5.52)
–8.757**
(–5.24)
Trend 0.413
–0.7
0.163
–0.3
–0.454
(–0.82)
0.41
–0.7
Depth –0.00391**
(–2.67)
–0.00377**
(–2.64)
–0.00390**
(–2.61)
–0.00374*
(–2.52)
Control of corruption 8.053**
–4.41
7.650**
–4.18
5.839**
–3.4
7.951**
–4.27
Dummy for cluster –3.297+
(–1.73)
1.368
–0.64
–1.561
(–0.72)
6.065*
–2.27
Constant 45.16**
–13.77
41.62**
–13.3
45.23**
–11.33
47.20**
–14.09
Observations 359 359 359 359
Source: IDB staff.
Note: t statistics in parentheses. 
‘+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
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ANNEX II
The index of relative or systemic importance. The index is generated from four broad compo-
nents extracted from the network of flows: i) importance as a recipient of flows; ii) importance 
as a transmitter of flows; iii) dependence; and iv) proximity. The first two are based on the val-
ues of credits and debits received. Dependence is based on quantifying how indispensable each 
sector is for the flows of funds from one sector to another. Finally, proximity is based on the 
volume of flows between sectors. Each component is normalized between 0 and 1, where 1 is 
equivalent to a higher level in each case. The index weights each one uniformly and their sum 
shows the relative importance.
Systemic importance of CAPDR compared to Colombia. With the aim of having a compara-
tive benchmark in Latin America, Graph AII.2 also includes the index for CAPDR in 2013 and 
Colombia.1 Colombia is a natural choice as a regional benchmark: it is a country, which has de-
veloped its financial system in the last decade and, in addition, has strengthened its fiscal sec-
tor through prudential reforms. Thus, comparing the value of the systemic importance index, it 
can be seen that it has tended to diminish in the region’s banking sector to stand very close to 
the value registered for Colombia in 2013. However, the same graph reveals some differences 
between the region and Colombia. One example is the high systemic importance of the public 
sector in CAPDR compared to Colombia. Another marked difference is that households and the 
monetary authority are much more important in Colombia than in CAPDR. This is consistent 
with the lower level of development of the financial and capital market in CAPDR.
The simulated network that minimizes fiscal costs. This network of flows is obtained begin-
ning with the current structure of credits and debits. As was explained in Box 3.1, the shock 
takes external financing back to levels similar to those of 2008. However, in this simulation, 
the procedure shown in Box 3.1 and the findings of Graph 3.7 are used to find the distribution 
of debits and credits that would reduce the fiscal cost as much as possible. This means that 
GRAPH AII.1 Components of the Index of Relative Importance in a Network of Flows
Receiver (Indegree)
X X
X
X
Y Y
Y
Y
Issuer (Outdegree) Dependency (Betweenness) Closeness
1 Considers information on flows between 2012 and 2013.
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the linkages between sectors change and 
therefore the patterns of debits and cred-
its are modified. With the new patterns of 
flows, indicators of systemic importance 
are generated. Graph AII.2 compares the 
index of relative importance to what was 
observed in CAPDR in 2013, the compa-
rable one for Colombia and the new sim-
ulated network. In their turn, the costs 
generated under this simulation are shown 
with blue bars in Graph 3.7. 
Dimensions of the macroprudential pol-
icy approach (see Graph AII.3). The first 
aspect of the macroprudential approach is the multi-sectoral dimension. This seeks to avoid 
common features, such as similar capital structures and the inter-connection between entities. 
But in the time dimension the pro-cyclicality of bank activity stands out as well as its impact on 
systemic risk.2 The latter has been extensively explored, while the multi-sectoral dimension has 
drawn attention only since the recent financial crisis. The multi-sectoral dimension focuses on 
the system of flows as a whole, not just those that occur within a particular sector. It considers 
that the aggregated risk depends on the behavior of institutions; that is, decisions, which can 
be rational individually, can be prejudicial when combined with those of all other institutions. 
This approach, unlike others applied previously, uses prudential instruments such as regulation 
and supervision, but with systemic goals 
rather than focusing on a specific sector. 
Furthermore, it demands a view of the ef-
fect of microprudential regulations beyond 
their immediate impact on the individual 
solvency of each sector or entity. In addi-
tion, it differs from the approaches to finan-
cial stability in general because it concen-
trates on macroeconomic aspects and the 
monetary stability of the country, and not 
only on forecasting the systemic stability 
of the financial sector. Graph AII.3 shows 
some of the measures included under the 
multi-sectoral dimension. 
GRAPH AII.2 Relative Importance in CAPDR
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Source: IDB staff estimates extracted from the matrix of average flows 
for the region. 
Note: The scale of the index is from 0 to 1.
GRAPH AII.3 Multi-Sectoral Policy Approach
Macroprudential
measures at
institutional
level, infrastructure
and regulation
Sectoral policies
and
instruments
Monetary
policy
Fiscal policy and
debt management
2 See, for example, Fernández de Lis (2010), Caruana (2010a) or Borio (2008)
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ANNEX III
Brief general description of the model employed. The impact of the recent fall in oil prices 
and the solid performance of the United States economy could contribute to an improvement 
in the prospects for CAPDR. To this end, a vector auto-regression (VAR) model is estimated on 
the basis of quarterly data from 1992 to 2014. The model consists of two blocks of variables, 
one external and the other internal. The first block, which includes growth in the United States, 
the oil price and financial volatility, makes it possible to capture the interactions of the exter-
nal environment. The second block captures the effect of the external variables on growth. It 
considers the average growth of the CAPDR region and inflation as endogenous variables while 
the variables of the external block are incorporated exogenously. 
The model can be represented in two parts. The first corresponds to the external block and its 
specification can be summed up in the following structural form:
AYt BYt C t= − + ∈1
Where Y is the vector of explanatory variables and ∈ is the error term, while A, B, and C are 
the parameter matrices. To ensure the identification of each parameter, the following restric-
tions are applied:
 and 
The second block is summarized in the following system:
Xt DXt EYt F t= − + +1 θ
Where X is the vector which includes the growth in regional GDP and inflation, while Y is the 
vector of external variables. D, E and F correspond to the respective parameter matrices. 
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